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Abstract
The traditional view in (philosophy of) cognitive science is that
computation in cognitive systems conceptually depends on represent-
ation: to compute is to manipulate representations. I argue that ac-
cepting the non-semantic teleomechanistic view of computation lays
the ground for a promising alternative strategy, in which computation
helps to explain and naturalise representation, rather than the other
way around. I show that this computation-based approach to rep-
resentation presents six decisive advantages over the traditional view.
I claim that it can improve the two most inuential current theor-
ies of representation, teleosemantics and structural representation, by
providing them with precious tools to tackle some of their main short-
comings. In addition, the computation-based approach opens up inter-
esting new theoretical paths for the project of naturalising represent-
ation, in which teleology plays a role in individuating computations,
but not representations.
1 Introduction
A long-lived and fruitful approach to understanding cognition and intelli-
gence is to see cognitive systems as performing computations over repres-
entational states. The basic idea is that, at least for many complex tasks,
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organisms behave appropriately and intelligently partly because they have
internal states  representations  that stand-in for things in the body
and world. What representations stand-in for, what they are about, are
their contents. Representational states are operated on by cognitive systems
by means of computational rules in a way consistent with their contents. If
the system is working correctly, the resulting representations for instance
motor commands  are the appropriate ones for the task at hand, as they
follow from adequate computational processing of accurate (enough) repres-
entations. This allows surrogative reasoning: using a surrogate to think,
reason, or process information about something else (Swoyer 1991). Instead
of directly manipulating the world, with all the risks that this entails, or-
ganisms can rst exploit internal surrogates to draw conclusions, integrate
information, simulate and evaluate behavioural strategies, etc.  all that
before trying something out in a world often intolerant of mistakes.
Its inuence and fruitfulness notwithstanding, alternatives to the compu-
tational-representational framework have been proposed, ranging from vari-
eties of eliminativism about representation (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983,
Hutto & Myin 2013), to varieties of subjectivism and perspectivalism about
computation (Searle 1992, Schweizer 2016, Dewhurst 2018a), to alternat-
ive frameworks for understanding cognition in general (Gibson 1979, Varela
et al. 1991, Thompson 2007). This paper will have little to say about the
ongoing debate between those in favour of representationalism and compu-
tationalism about cognition, and those that oppose these ideas partially or
fully. My focus is on issues internal to the representational-computational
camp, and especially on the project of accounting for the nature and role
of representation, which lies at its philosophical centre. More specically, I
will be concerned exclusively with cognitive representation  the notion of
representation most relevant to the cognitive sciences  which is typically
ascribed to subpersonal states and processes in cognitive systems1.
If representation and computation are to be notions that lie at the found-
ations of the study of cognition and intelligence, it is widely held that we
1I will often talk of representation simpliciter in what follows, even though by this I
refer only to cognitive representation.
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must oer naturalistic, scientically-acceptable accounts of both notions.
Otherwise the risk remains that the representational-computational research
programme in the cognitive sciences is grounded on scientically problematic
notions, causing the whole theoretical edice eventually to crumble2. Con-
sequently, the twin projects of naturalising representation and naturalising
computation have occupied philosophers for the past forty years or so. In-
terestingly, naturalistic theories of representation, with few exceptions (e.g.
Cummins 1989, Milkowski 2013, Egan 2014), have given little attention to the
ways in which computation may help shed light on representation. Quite on
the contrary, the tendency has been to see representation as helping account
for computation, a `received view' that the Fodorian slogan `no computation
without representation' nicely captures (Sprevak 2010). Part of the reason
for the neglect of computation may originate from the fact that alternat-
ives to the received view tend to be very liberal in bestowing computational
nature on physical systems  making them of little explanatory use.
I suggest that abandoning the received view of computation in favour
of a robust teleology-based view is a promising strategy for theories of rep-
resentation. The best such theory currently on oer is the teleomechanistic
view, which reserves an important role for teleology in accounting for com-
putation (Piccinini 2015, Milkowski 2013, Coelho Mollo 2018). Appealing to
teleology in making sense of computation within a theory of representation,
I argue, has much to recommend it, insofar as it makes theories of represent-
ation more solid, whilst doing justice to the currently widespread suspicion
that teleology is, in some way or another, important for representation. I
suggest that instead of explaining computation by means of representation,
as per the traditional view, we should do exactly the opposite: explaining
representation by means of computation  a theoretical path adumbrated
by computational mechanists such as Piccinini and Milkowski. Instead of
2Some are less exercised by this worry, holding that the scientic fruitfulness of rep-
resentation and computation are sucient to assure us of their scientic respectability
(Burge 2010, Rescorla 2013). Although these are indeed good evidential grounds for their
respectability, the history of science is rich in examples of similarly explanatorily useful
notions that turned out to be misguided. Trying to get additional guarantees is thus a
commendable pursuit.
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Fodor's, we should endorse Milkowski's (2013, p. 166) dictum: `there is no
representation without computation'.
In this paper, I will lay out in detail some of crucial advantages that a
computation-based account oers for shedding light on cognitive represent-
ation, especially once we subscribe to the teleomechanistic view of compu-
tation. My aim here is not to oer a full-edged computation-based theory
of representation, but rather to outline the shape that such accounts may
take. Some accounts are best seen as improvements over extant theories of
representation, but the computation-based approach also opens the way to
novel strategies for naturalising representation. In this paper, I will remain
neutral on the best way to go between these two options: my aim is to show
why we should go for a computation-based approach to representation at all,
upending the traditional picture.
Here is how I will proceed in what follows. In section 2 I briey review
the motivations and main shortcomings of the currently most inuential ap-
proaches to representation: teleosemantics, and structural representation.
In section 3, I propose that theories of representation should abandon the
received view of computation and rather endorse a teleo-based view, such as
the teleomechanistic account. In section 4, I argue that placing a robust,
teleo-based theory of computation at the basis of theories of representation
presents six distinctive advantages, yielding accounts of cognitive represent-
ation more capable of confronting some of the weighty hurdles that lie in the
path of the naturalisation project.
2 Representation:
between teleology and resemblance
Perhaps the main challenge to theories of representation is to identify a set
of natural relations between internal states and processes and external en-
tities such that those internal states and processes come to be endowed with
fairly determinate and explanatorily useful contents. The quest for determ-
inacy of content is closely related to another central issue for theories of
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representation: making space for misrepresentation. A signicant notion of
misrepresentation seems to be possible only when representations have fairly
determinate contents. If a representation represents all sorts of dierent en-
tities, it becomes unclear when it is correct or adequate, and when it is an
instance of representational error, or misrepresentation. A further aim is
to show how physical vehicles can play distinctively representational roles,
which Ramsey (2007) calls this the `job description challenge'. Determinacy
of content and misrepresentation have commanded the attention of most of
the philosophical literature on cognitive representation.
In this section, I will argue that the three most promising naturalistic
theories of representation currently on oer  producer- and consumer-based
teleosemantics, and structural representation  illustrate a metatheoretical
problem with the traditional approach to naturalising representation. Either
traditional naturalistic theories appeal to teleology in xing content so as to
try and secure determinate contents and the possibility of misrepresentation,
and in consequence incur in problems with teleology itself and its coarse-
grainedness; or they eschew appeal to teleology, but then end up being overly
liberal in their bestowal of representational status and contents, jeopardising
the explanatory role of the notion and the possibility of misrepresentation.
2.1 Teleological theories of representation
Teleological, or teleo-based theories of representation, appeal to teleology in
xing representational status and/or content. Teleology refers, roughly, to
what something is for, to its function, purpose or aim, and it is typically
cashed out naturalistically in terms of the grounds for the past selection of
a trait or entity by some selection process  natural selection being an im-
portant, though non-exclusive such selective process (Garson 2019). What
something is for, in this sense, is its teleofunction. Traits of biological or-
ganisms are clear examples: hearts have the teleofunction, the purpose, of
pumping blood since it is because past instances of the type pumped blood
that hearts contributed to the survival and inclusive tness of organisms
having them. This led in turn to hearts persisting across time: they have
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been selected for because they pump blood3. Teleology embodies a weak
form of normativity: an entity that fails to full its teleofunction  e.g. a
heart that fails to pump blood adequately, or at all  malfunctions.
There are two main families of teleo-based theories of representation,
both of which remain popular to this day. Producer-based teleosemantics,
or teleoinformational semantics, focuses on the information carried by rep-
resentations, typically determined by the worldly entities that they carry
information about, or correlate with (Dretske 1988, Neander 2017). The
guiding idea is that the content of a representation are those conditions
that the representation has the teleofunction to carry information about (or
be correlated with). For instance, a cognitive (sub)system may have the
teleofunction to produce representations that carry information about the
presence of food, whereby the representations it produces have the content
food present or some such.
Consumer-based teleosemantics, often referred to simply as teleoseman-
tics, focuses instead on what the teleofunctions of the (sub)systems that use
representations are (Millikan 1984, 2017). Roughly, on this picture the con-
tent of a representation consists in the conditions that led the system using
the representation to full its teleofunction. If what caused the selection of a
certain system is that it responded to certain representations in such a way
as to bring the containing organism to ingest food, then the condition that
led the system to selective success was the presence of food  whereby the
representations it consumes have the content food present or some such.
Although in some cases the content ascriptions that follow from the two
families of theories cohere, they often do not4. At any rate, both have prima
3In the case of possible future articial cognitive systems  should real, `strong' arti-
cial intelligence ever be achieved  the kinds of factors relevant for bestowing teleological
functions on them will almost certainly be mind-dependent and distinct from the factors
underpinning natural teleology, being dependent either directly on intentions, ideas, and
purposes of designers and users; or indirectly, in the likely case that such systems will be
the result of articial processes that may or may not mimic the natural processes that led
to the evolution of cognitive systems and intelligent organisms.
4Famous cases of divergent content ascriptions include (toy versions of) magnetotactic
bacteria, so-called bug-detectors in toads, and imaginary cases such as Pietroski's (1992)
kimus.
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facie the tools to yield determinate contents and make space for misrep-
resentation. Teleology helps x the content of representations, discarding
those candidate contents that are not grounded in natural teleology. Since it
involves a weak form of normativity, the appeal to teleology makes misrep-
resentation possible. A token representation produced or consumed in ways
that are at odds with the teleofunctions of its producers and/or consumers is
a misrepresentation, insofar as it has been produced or consumed by systems
that fail, in that instance at least, to full their teleofunctions.
Appeal to teleology in theories of representation has been met with im-
portant challenges.
An inuential objection is the functional indeterminacy challenge. In a
nutshell, the objection purports to show that teleology fails to yield su-
ciently determinate representational contents, being unable to cut contents
nely enough (Fodor 1990). Dedicated neural circuitry in toads generates
snapping of their tongues when they detect small moving dark spots in their
visual elds. Given that in toads' usual habitat small moving dark spots
happen to be edible insects, this circuitry has been plausibly selected by
evolution given its adaptive value. At least three dierent contents, insect
present, food present, and moving dark spot present, can lead to selective
success, given the environments where frogs live and thrive. In consequence,
teleology per se cannot decide between these dierent content ascriptions,
leading to indeterminacy of content.
A more general objection to appeals to teleology in accounting for rep-
resentation is due to Cummins (1996), Burge (2010). They point out that
natural teleology concerns only behavioural success, since it is this kind of
success that leads to selection. Behavioural success, they argue, is separate,
and sometimes in conict with, representational success  representational
accuracy may often be too costly to be adaptive. Teleology cannot thereby
play a role in theories of representation, for what generates appropriate be-
haviour need not represent the world correctly. Teleological theories run
together two types of correctness, behavioural and representational, that are
independent of one another, and although they may coincide in some cases,
they need not so do.
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2.2 Non-teleological theories of representation
I will not assess the merits of such objections. They are partly responsible,
however, for motivating theorists to try and come up with theories of repres-
entation that do not appeal to teleology. Such theories, with few exceptions,
have lost popularity in the past few decades, which have been marked by a
dominance of teleo-based views  as well as of a less optimistic attitude to-
wards theories of representation in general (Godfrey-Smith 2006). Important
examples of non-teleological theories include causal-informational semantics
(Dretske 1981, Fodor 1987, Usher 2001), structural representation (Cum-
mins 1989, Ramsey 2007, Isaac 2012), and content pragmatism (Egan 2014,
Coelho Mollo 2020b). Content pragmatism rejects the naturalisation project,
and thus I will not discuss it further. Causal-informational semantics has
been largely abandoned, since it has proved to have serious problems with
indeterminacy of content, falling victim to the disjunction problem (Fodor
1984; but see Usher 2001 for an improved version of the view). An ad-
ditional ground for its decline is the fact that a teleo-based alternative to
it, which keeps much of its spirit, is far superior, namely producer-based
teleosemantics. For these reasons, I will mostly be concerned with the non-
teleological theory of representation that has enjoyed most attention in the
past few years: structural representation.
Structural representation is a sophisticated version of resemblance the-
ories of representation. It holds that a large factor in determining represent-
ational status and content is that representations and what they represent
share relational structure. For instance, the spatial relations between points
on a map are similar to the spatial relations between locations in the city
mapped. Sharing relational structure, or structural resemblance, is seen as
crucial for something to stand in for something else, i.e. to play a represent-
ational role. It is because two structures share all or part of their relational
structures that one can be used in the place of the other in reasoning or cog-
nitive processing  as I can use a map to plan my future movements when
visiting a new city. Content is partly, if not fully, determined by the relevant
structural resemblance relation. Several proposals exist as to how to under-
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stand structural resemblance precisely, typically having recourse to dierent
kinds of mapping relation, or morphisms, between structures, such as iso-
morphism and homomorphism. Often the relevant relational structure over
the representational vehicles is taken to be computational in nature, yield-
ing thus versions of computational role semantics (Cummins 1989, Ramsey
2007).
The central diculty for structural representation theories is their lib-
erality. Structural resemblance relations are notoriously easy to come by,
and dicult to constrain in principled ways (McLendon 1955, Shea 2013).
A problematic consequence of liberality is that representational status is be-
stowed on an enormous amount of vehicles, watering down the explanatory
purchase of appeal to representation. Furthermore, resemblance relations are
reexive and symmetrical, while representation relations are not, suggesting
that the former are the wrong tools to understand the latter (Goodman
1976). Finally, liberality also infects content determination: since any rep-
resentational vehicle stands in structural resemblance relations to a large
amount of things in the world, its contents, barring further constraining
factors, will be wildly non-unique5. Explanation of appropriate behaviour
in terms of content, and of inappropriate behaviour in terms of misrepres-
entation, thus risks losing much of its distinctive value, since representations
will have disjunctive contents that include both task-appropriate and task-
inappropriate contents. This makes appeal to content largely uninteresting,
and moreover picking and choosing the appropriate contents out of the dis-
junction begs the questions that accounts of content are meant to answer.
Some authors add further requirements to constrain the preferred morph-
ism and avoid liberality, including being generated by a causal process origin-
ating from what is represented (Isaac 2012), and being the one relevant for
the use that the representation is put to by the system (Ramsey 2007, Shea
2014). Many teleo-based theories also make space for structural represent-
ation, adding a teleological constraint to the content-determining structural
5Cummins (1996) is a proponent of structural representation who bites this bullet: he
claims that content is non-unique, but tries to save the explanatory power of representation
by appeal to a teleological theory of representational targets.
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resemblance relation (Millikan 2004, Neander 2017, Shea 2018).
It is not my aim to assess whether and to what extent these additions
to the basic idea underlying structural representation are successful. I wish
only to bring to the fore a metatheoretical problem in existing attempts
at naturalising representation. For it seems that we either have to appeal
to natural teleology in accounting for representational status and content,
thus having trouble with functional indeterminacy and with the conation
of biological and representational success; or, if we reject appeal to teleology,
we end up with overly liberal theories of representation, making appeal to
the notion explanatorily uninteresting. In what follows, I wish to suggest one
way of moving forward, building on insights by Piccinini (2015), Milkowski
(2013). Namely, that a promising way to go is to appeal to teleology in
individuating computation, in addition to or in alternative to, appealing to
teleology in individuating representation and content.
3 Teleology in Computation
According to the semantic view of computation, dominant especially within
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, physical computation presupposes
representation: computation essentially involves the transformation of states
with representational content (Sprevak 2010). Including a semantic con-
straint in a theory of computation is widely seen as a necessary move in order
to curb pancomputationalism, that is, the claim that everything computes
one or more functions (limited pancomputationalism), or that everything
computes any function (unlimited pancomputationalism). Pancomputation-
alism, especially of the unlimited sort, jeopardises the explanatory role of
computation in the computer and cognitive sciences, insofar as it makes
the notion apply overly liberally and in ways that are at odds with sci-
entic practice (Piccinini 2015, chap. 4). Imposing a semantic constraint on
computation is a promising strategy to avoid pancomputationalism. Since
plausibly relatively few systems are representational, the set of computa-
tional systems will at most be identical with, but more likely a subset of, the
set of representational systems. Few physical systems will thereby count as
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computational under the semantic view.
Appealing to semantics in accounting for computation comes with a price.
First, the success of the account depends on the success of an independ-
ent theory of representation, and one that cannot rely on computation, on
pain of circularity (Piccinini 2015, pp. 33-4)6. Second, the semantic view
only succeeds in avoiding pancomputationalism and doing justice to scientic
practice, two of its central aims, if the theory of representation it relies on is
not overly liberal in its turn7, and if it individuates as computational (and
non-computational) those physical systems that the computer and cognitive
sciences take to be such. The latter is particularly troubling for the semantic
view, since arguably many systems considered to be computational by the
computer sciences do not seem to have a semantics, at least not of the ex-
ternalist kind most relevant to cognitive representation. Third, the semantic
view precludes what can be a promising avenue to explore in making sense
of cognitive representation, namely basing it on physical computation 8.
Until recently, the main alternatives to the received view were non-
semantic views based on mappings between abstract computational states
and rules, and causal transitions between physical states and processes (Chalmers
2011). To compute, on this view, is to have a causal structure onto which an
abstract computational description  i.e. in terms of functions from input
types to output types  can be mapped. Causal mapping views admittedly
suer from problems relating to limited pancomputationalism. Since nearly
every physical system has internal causal structure, it follows that nearly
all physical systems compute at least one function, and typically more than
one.
Proponents of the view argue that limited pancomputationalism does not
endanger the explanatory power of the notion of computation. I take this
strategy to be misguided. First, by connecting computation too closely to
6Perhaps more promising are views that see representation and computation as mutu-
ally co-dening, such as Ramsey (2007).
7Theories that tend toward panrepresentationalism, such as Cummins' (1996), are
therefore of no help.
8See Piccinini (2015) for further shortcomings of semantic views, and Shagrir (2018)
for a recent partial defence.
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causal structure, causal mapping views fail to give the notion of computa-
tion a distinctive explanatory role over and above that already granted to
the notion of causal structure (Milkowski 2013). Moreover, limited pancom-
putationalism is more pernicious than they take it to be, as it ies in the
face of the explanatory practices of the computational and cognitive sciences,
which regard computational systems as a rather small subset of existing sys-
tems. Finally, since causal structures, as such, do not involve any sort of
normativity, causal accounts cannot make space for an objective notion of
miscomputation.
In the past years, a more compelling non-semantic view has been pro-
posed: the teleomechanistic view (Milkowski 2013, Piccinini 2015, Coelho Mollo
2018). The theory makes use of the inuential neo-mechanistic framework
of scientic explanation to try and shed light on the nature of physical com-
putation. Importantly, it reserves a central role for teleology in the indi-
viduation of computational systems. In the rest of this paper, I will argue
that endorsing the teleomechanistic view of computation leads to many valu-
able advantages for theories of representation. A brief presentation of the
teleomechanistic view will suce for my purposes.
According to the neo-mechanistic approach to scientic explanation, a
mechanism consists of the entities, their activities (i.e. what they do), and
their organisation that are responsible for a certain phenomenon (Illari &
Williamson 2012). Given a phenomenon to be explained, explanation pro-
ceeds by decomposing the system into the components, their organisation,
and their causal roles that explain how the phenomenon comes about or is
maintained across time. Mechanisms are thereby individuated by the phe-
nomena they explain, and comprise only those components and causal roles
that are relevant to the explanation of the phenomenon at hand. Some mech-
anisms may also have teleofunctions: there may be some function they are
supposed to perform due to design or selection processes. They are teleo-
mechanisms. Artefacts, and biological mechanisms such as hearts, are good
examples of teleomechanisms.
The teleomechanistic view of physical computation applies the central
aspects of mechanistic philosophy to try and shed light on the nature of
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computational systems in the world (rather than in mathematical theory).
According to the view, computational systems are mechanisms with the tele-
ofunction to compute, where computing is understood as the manipulation
of vehicles according to rules sensitive only to some dimensions of variation
of the physical vehicles, i.e. their degrees of freedom. A rule, in its turn, is
a mapping from input-types (and possibly types of internal states) to (types
of internal states and) output-types  where the types are individuated in
terms of the structural and/or functional organisation of the mechanism.
The appeal to teleology plays (at least) a triple role in the account. First,
it reveals a privileged phenomenon, i.e. a teleological function, that guides
the individuation and decomposition of the mechanism into its components
and their activities. Second, it helps avoid pancomputationalism of any sort,
since plausibly relatively few systems possess teleofunctions of any kind 
clear cases being biological traits and artefacts  and even fewer the tele-
ofunction to perform computations  plausibly only designed computers
and, if computational theories of cognition are correct, cognitive systems.
Third, it makes space for miscomputation, since computational systems can
compute functions other than the ones it is their teleofunction to compute,
therefore miscomputing9. For instance, a system may have the teleofunction
to compute a certain function f from inputs to outputs  given selection his-
tory or design but due to a defect or overload, may in some circumstances
compute function g instead. Given that the system, in such instances, fails
to compute the function it is its teleofunction to compute, it miscomputes.
The mechanistic view has been shown to be descriptively and explanat-
orily adequate (Milkowski 2013, Piccinini 2015). Importantly, it individuates
computation without making recourse to representation. Computations may
take place over representational vehicles, but need not: computation does
not depend essentially on representation. Being robust, non-trivial, and
non-semantic, such a view of computation opens the path to exploring the
9They may also malfunction more catastrophically, failing to compute any function
at all. Although this is a case of malfunction, it is not a case of miscomputation, since
no computation takes place. See Tucker (2018) for a detailed and compelling account of
miscomputation within the mechanistic view.
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idea that cognitive representation can be partly accounted for in terms of
computation, rather than the other way around.
4 Representation and Computational Teleology
The teleomechanistic view of physical computation oers a solid non-semantic
basis that theories of cognitive representation  within the computational-
representational framework  can make use of. More generally, having a
theory of representation rely on a teleological theory of computation presents
many advantages. I will here explore six of the most central ones, occasion-
ally putting them in connection with current theories. My contention is that
the computation-based approach to representation is promising in at least
two ways: it can modify extant theories of representation such that they are
better able to tackle their main shortcomings; and it can suggest compelling
theories of representation importantly at odds with current approaches. The
rest of this paper will be dedicated to showing why this is so.
4.1 Naturalistic credentials
A rst motivation in favour of computation-based accounts is that the sci-
entic status of computation seems to be less controversial than that of
representation, and the prospects for its direct naturalisation seem rosier.
Representation is essentially dened by a property that is not easy to make
sense of by recourse to the natural sciences. The property of being about
something else, of being directed toward something else  aboutness, in-
tentionality  seems importantly dierent from the kinds of properties at
work in the basic sciences, and particularly dicult to explain in natural-
istic terms. While signicant progress has been made on the naturalisation of
representation, the lack of consensus that persists despite decades of focused
philosophical work attests to the diculty of the project.
Computation, on the other hand, is a notion that came to theoretical
maturity as already importantly tied to mechanisation (albeit of a purely
abstract sort), in the form of the Turing machine, and later on of concretely
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implementable computational architectures. Its relations to properties and
processes amenable to mechanical explanation are much more direct if com-
pared to representation. Using computation as an important stepping stone
to account for representation therefore suggests itself as a promising theor-
etical move. For if computation can be more easily naturalised, we can use
it as a starting point for a naturalistic theory of representation.
In light of these considerations, it is curious that most philosophical work
in the area tended to start with representation, rather than computation.
There is much to be said about the reasons for this, but I would like to men-
tion three tentative ones. First, representation was recognised as central to
explaining cognition and intelligence very early in the history of philosophy,
starting at least with Plato (e.g. in the Theaetetus); while recognition of the
importance of computation came much later, Hobbes being a precursor of
the explosion in interest that took place in the second half of the twentieth
century following advances in the theoretical and practical understanding
of computational systems. Second, computation is appealed to in helping
explain how representations are transformed in task-appropriate ways, with
representation's aboutness taken to play the lion's share of explaining suc-
cessful behaviour. Third, as hinted above, the predominant views of com-
putation until recently were extremely liberal and of little explanatory use
if not properly constrained, and representation, being already a central part
of theories of cognition and intelligence, seemed the natural choice to curb
that pernicious liberality.
The teleomechanistic view of computation allows us to do away with
this latter motivation for the received picture. The former two, on their
hand, do not justify the received view, but merely shed light on the mostly
historical grounds for its apparent intuitiveness. They should therefore be
weighted against the considerations I brought to bear above in favour of
starting with computation instead, which I take to shift the balance toward
the computation-based approach. Be as it may, the foregoing line of reas-
oning is suggestive, but far from decisive. Stronger reasons, I believe, come
from the considerations that follow.
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4.2 Causal relevance and explanation
Giving pride of place to the notion of computation in a theory of repres-
entation helps to account for the causal powers of representational vehicles,
courtesy of a theory of computational implementation. This has been often
seen as the main (if not the only) contribution that the notion of computa-
tion makes to the computational-representational framework in the cognitive
sciences (Fodor 1975, Haugeland 1981): appeal to computation helps explain
how physical vehicles can behave in ways that respect semantic and ration-
ality constraints, such as preserving truth in deductive arguments, being
responsive to practical reasons, or playing good chess. The physical vehicles
must be so regimented as to follow computational rules that mirror to a
relevant extent semantic or rationality constraints, thus being able to work
as representational vehicles, i.e. the physical states that carry representa-
tional content. Representational vehicles are causally ecacious in virtue of
their physical properties. Theories of computational implementation build a
bridge between the somewhat abstract level of the computational individu-
ation of a system, and the details of the causally ecacious physical processes
that realise, or implement, the computations it performs. Computation, in
this way, connects semantic, causally inecacious properties with physical,
causally ecacious ones. Thereby  the accepted picture goes  cognition,
thought, and intelligence can be physically explained.
This may seem to be an advantage that the teleomechanistic view of
computation, in contrast to other non-semantic views, cannot have, since
the factors relevant for determining teleological functions are causally inert,
being historical rather than occurrent10. Since the teleomechanistic view
builds causally inert factors into its conditions of individuation for compu-
tation, one may worry that it cannot provide the desired bridge between
representational and causal explanation. In this central respect, therefore,
the foregoing view may seem to be inferior to its competitors.
Such a worry, I believe, trades on a failure to distinguish individuation
10Appealing to non-etiological theories of teleological function, as Piccinini (2015) re-
commends, does not avoid the problem, given that, as Garson (2019) compellingly argues,
such theories make covert appeal to historical factors.
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from implementation, a distinction that has played an important role in
debates about mental causation. While individuative properties need not
be causally ecacious, implementational properties do. Take for instance a
1¿ coin. What individuates it as a 1¿ coin, beside its physical properties
(shape, weight, materials, colour, etc.), is the fact that it has been minted
by an authorised European mint. Other objects may share all the occurrent
properties of 1¿ coins, but fail to be 1¿ coins because they lack the appro-
priate history. Historical properties are causally inecacious: a 1¿ coin and
a perfect counterfeit have the same causal powers, since they share the same
occurrent properties. But this does not make 1¿ coins causally inecacious,
for their causal powers (e.g. interacting appropriately with ticket machines)
depend on the occurrent properties of their `implementation', that is, the
entities in the world that the individuation conditions pick out.
Computation, under the teleomechanistic view, is similarly a kind that
is partly individuated by historical properties. This makes it so that two
physically identical systems  with identical causal powers  may dier in
computational nature if one has the teleofunction to compute  a historical
property  and the other does not. However, individuation conditions, if
they successfully apply to entities in the world, pick out physical systems that
possess causal powers. Computational individuation picks out those physical
systems that implement computations, insofar as they have the appropriate
occurrent and historical properties. The implementing systems have causal
powers, and a subset of these causal powers must be such that they full the
appropriate parts of the individuation conditions of computation, namely
the systematic transformation of inputs into outputs. Therefore, the teleo-
mechanistic view, as other theories of computation, does not threaten the
role of computation in connecting semantic properties with physical, caus-
ally ecacious ones via computational implementation. For the mechan-
istic view appeals to teleology in the individuation of computational systems
and computational functions, and not in order to account for computational
implementation, which is purely mechanistic (Coelho Mollo 2018, Tucker
2018)11.
11For a detailed analysis of the relationships between computation and implementation
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The fact that the causal powers of computational systems hinge on their
occurrent, implementational properties, does not make the appeal to tele-
ology idle. For teleology helps individuate those physical systems that are
computational to start with, and thereby that implement physical computa-
tions by means of some of their causal properties. Without such a demanding
individuation condition, a theory of computation is forced to embrace pan-
computationalism  given the ubiquity of causal relations  with all the
accompanying problems (see section 4.3 below) 12.
In some cases, such as in structural representation, the causal powers of
representational states may be more directly explained in terms of repres-
entations being computational structures that stand in structural mapping
relations to representational contents. Here, computational structure cap-
tures a central part of what it is for physical states and processes to represent,
helping explain how they generate appropriate behaviour by means of work-
ing as surrogates to their contents (Swoyer 1991, O'Brien 2015, Gladziejewski
& Milkowski 2017). Importantly, a robust mechanistic theory of computa-
tion allows us to individuate the causal powers of computational states and
processes independently of a theory of representation, thus paving the way,
without the threat of liberality or circularity, to basing the causal powers of
representations on the causal powers of computations.
4.3 Liberality
A robust, non-liberal theory of physical computation, such as the teleomech-
anistic view, can help constrain the states and processes in the world that
are candidates for representational status. In a theory of representation that
takes seriously the computational part of the representational-computational
framework, only those states and processes that are part of computational
mechanisms can count as representational. This narrowing down of candid-
in the mechanistic view, see Elber-Dorozko & Shagrir (2019). I endorse what they call the
`separate hierarchies' view.
12Dewhurst (2018a) is a good illustration of this problem: by eschewing appeal to tele-
ology, he has to accept pancomputationalism. This leads to problems with the explanatory
value of computation, which Dewhurst tries to tackle by appeal to epistemic perspectives.
See Coelho Mollo (2020a) for criticism.
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ates for representational status is something that only views that ascribe
computations to an adequately limited set of physical systems can oer.
Moreover, the account of computation must be non-semantic, on pain of be-
ing circular, or at least uninformative  if we individuate computation by
means of representation, appeal to computation is idle in narrowing down
the domain of the representational.
The teleomechanistic view is the only non-semantic account of compu-
tation that is constrained in this way. Causal mapping accounts, the most
sophisticated alternative non-semantic view, lead (at least) to limited pan-
computationalism. They fail to narrow down candidates for representational
status by means of appeal to computation, since they ascribe computational
nature to (almost) all systems. The teleomechanistic view, on the other
hand, poses demanding constraints on candidate representational states and
processes. Representational states and processes are a subset of computa-
tional states and processes, and given that the latter are relatively rare, the
claim has considerable bite. Indeed, it excludes all those states and pro-
cesses of the system that do not contribute to its computational capacities
from being candidates for representational status.
In the case of biological cognitive systems, for instance, states and pro-
cesses that involve glia and blood vessels are not representations, since as far
as we know they do not play computational roles  even though they cer-
tainly play roles sustaining the states and processes that do play such roles,
in partial analogy to what fans and batteries do in electronic computers. In a
way true to the spirit of the computational-representational approach to the
cognitive sciences, computation helps capture those properties of cognitive
systems that are directly relevant to cognition and intelligent behaviour13.
In brief, a robust, teleo-based theory of computation helps to delimit
the set of physical vehicles that can play representational roles. This is a
13There may be cognitive abilities that exploit in part non-computational processes,
such as random processes. The foregoing account does not rule this out, but rather
focuses on those abilities, arguably the majority, that either in part or fully employ com-
putational processes. The account of computation at play here is moreover general enough
to encompass digital, analogical, and possibly other forms of computation, such as neural
computation (Piccinini & Bahar 2013).
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welcome addition to theories of representation insofar as it helps to avoid
the danger of being overly liberal about representational status. This is
particularly important for structural representation theories, since the rep-
resentational relation they rely on, i.e. mapping relations of some sort, is
overly unconstrained, risking to lead both to too many things being bestowed
representational status, and to radical indeterminacy of content. Endorse-
ment of the teleomechanistic view of computation contributes to avoiding
these unwanted results in at least two ways.
First, it constrains considerably the kinds of physical vehicles that can
stand in the content-constituting mapping relations that structural repres-
entation theories identify. The teleomechanistic view individuates a relat-
ively small subset of physical systems that are computational, and only a sub-
set thereof will acquire representational status: those computational states
and processes that stand in the relevant mapping relation to worldly states
of aairs. As should be clear, this is only part of the solution to liberality.
For it to succeed, it also requires that the overall theory of representation
be able to individuate to some precision the worldly states of aairs that
are candidates for standing in the relevant mapping relations, that is, to
be representational contents. Promising solutions to this issue have been
put forward by Ramsey (2007) and Shea (2018), who appeal to organismic
embeddedness and behavioural salience to help identify the candidate con-
tents. Together, teleomechanistic computation and additional requirements
such as these further constrain the relevant content-xing mapping relation,
attenuating the problems that structural representation theories have with
liberality.
Second, narrowing down the candidate vehicles for cognitive representa-
tions indirectly contributes to meeting indeterminacy of content challenges.
In light of the fact that the theory of computation individuates the internal
computational states and processes of the cognitive system in ways inde-
pendent from representational status, it helps constrain the kinds of content
that can be ascribed to such states and processes. Given the computational
prole of such states, how they interface with other computational states
and sensory and motor surfaces, only some contents are compatible with
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the computational workings of the system, many others being implausible
insofar as they clash with  or t rather unnaturally  the computational
prole of the vehicles. Admittedly, these constraints by themselves are in-
sucient to solve content indeterminacy problems, but they help, and given
the diculties involved, any help is welcome.
4.4 Objections to teleo-based representation do not apply
It is possible to do justice to the insight that representation is in some way
tied to natural teleology, as per teleo-based views of representation, whilst
avoiding having to view the connection as directly tied to content determ-
ination. Instead, teleological considerations may come into play exclusively
in the individuation of physical computation, generating theories that are
teleo-based, insofar as they depend on a teleo-based notion of computation,
but that do not use teleology to determine content. This can be helpful
for preserving a role for teleology in accounting for representation, while
avoiding the main lines of objection against teleo-based views. As I show
below, appealing to teleology to individuate computation is not liable to the
central kinds of objections that have been raised against a similar appeal in
individuating representation.
First, since computations are not individuated in terms of representa-
tion, the claim that representational contents are ner-grained than what
natural teleology can provide is irrelevant. Second, computations, in con-
trast to representations, are individuated in a relatively coarse-grained way,
so that, even assuming that teleology is a rather blunt tool with which to
carve nature, no indeterminacy challenge analogous to the one that confronts
representation aects computation. Let me expand on this point.
If computations are considered to be a matter of performance of logical
or mathematical functions, it may seem that similar indeterminacy problems
appear. It is plausible that natural teleology cannot distinguish between per-
formance of (some) equivalent logical or mathematical functions, since more
than one such function maps equally well onto causal goings-on in physical
systems. As Shagrir (2001), Sprevak (2010) have shown, this is true of the
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basic logical functions performed by logic gates, the most basic computa-
tional components: AND-gates and OR-gates, in isolation, are functionally
indistinguishable.
Even if this is true, it should not worry proponents of the teleomechan-
istic view of computation. For according to inuential versions of the view,
computations are input-output functions implemented by components of a
mechanism. Input-output functions are understood extensionally, in terms of
transformations of physical quantities (Dewhurst 2018b), or in terms of func-
tional states and transitions revealed by the functional decomposition of the
system (Coelho Mollo 2018, Fresco & Milkowski forthcoming). Teleofunc-
tions to perform physical or functional input-output functions do not pose
indeterminacy worries, since if two such functions are physically/functionally
equivalent, they count as the same function, regardless of whether they can
be mapped onto dierent logical or mathematical functions14. Computations
can therefore be individuated partly by teleology without this leading to a
multiplicity of individuated computations.
In brief, the indeterminacy problems that follow from appealing to tele-
ology in individuating representations do not transpose to individuating
computation by analogous means. In contrast to the ne-grainedness of
representational individuation  which must (often) distinguish between co-
extensional but distinct contents  computational individuation is coarse-
grained enough for teleology to carve the computational domain adequately.
Furthermore, physical and functional states and processes are the kinds of
states to which selection processes are sensitive; selection processes being at
the core of the most promising family of theories of natural teleology, namely
selected-eects theories. There is thereby no problematic gap between com-
putational correctness and behavioural success, as there may be in the case
14This is an ontological, not an epistemological point. It may be challenging to discover
which input-output function a computational mechanism has the teleofunction to perform,
given the epistemic opacity of past selection processes, and the complexity of cognitive
systems. However, this does not detract from the claim that, if the foregoing view is
correct, there is a fact of the matter about what teleofunctions a computational system
has. At any rate, recent developments in computational neuroscience provide reasons to
be hopeful (Kriegeskorte & Douglas 2018). I thank Rosa Cao for pressing me on this
point.
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of representational correctness: computational systems have the computa-
tional teleofunctions they do because they have been selected for, and they
have been selected for because they contribute, often enough, to behavioural
success. Moreover, while it is arguable that there can be no biological func-
tions to represent, as Burge (2010) insists  I remain neutral on whether
his arguments succeed  it seems extremely implausible to claim that there
can be no biological functions to perform input-output functions of specic
types, since this is arguably what most biological functions, including non-
computational ones, consist in (e.g. taking food as input and generating
energy as output)15. In consequence, the second inuential line of objection
against teleo-based theories of representation does not apply to teleo-based
theories of computation.
4.5 Internal complexity
The non-semantic individuation of the internal computational structure of
cognitive systems that the teleomechanistic view oers also helps to address
an additional, less discussed diculty that confronts teleo-based views of
representation. As Cao (2012) points out, teleosemantics seems ill-suited to
capture the internal complexity involved in bringing about cognitive capa-
cities. The intermediate states between sensory input and motor behaviour
are, as cognitive psychology and neuroscience have shown, extremely com-
plex both in terms of the number of contributing internal states, and of
their interactions, which are marked by a plurality of dependence relations,
feedback, excitatory and inhibitory connections, degeneracy, and redund-
ancy. This makes it so that the causal nexus between initial representation
producer  in most cases a sensory surface  and the nal representation
consumer  typically responsible for generating motor behaviour  is highly
mediated.
Teleo-based theories of representation may pursue two main strategies
in trying to accommodate this point, none of which is satisfying. On the
15The medium-independence of computation, however, does pose a challenge. See
Coelho Mollo (2019) for an extended treatment of this problem and more generally for a
defence of the idea that there are teleofunctions to compute.
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one hand, focusing only on the initial representation producer and the nal
representation consumer is unlikely to vindicate the explanatory purchase of
representational explanation in cognitive science, as it fails to make sense of
the role played by the intermediate vehicles in bringing about complex and
intelligent behaviour. Breaking down cognitive systems into their functional
and mechanistic components, and shedding light on their contributions to
cognition and intelligence, is the main aim of cognitive science. A theory of
representation that is silent about intermediate vehicles is thereby inadequate
to the cognitive sciences.
On the other hand, recognising the complex organisation of internal pro-
ducers and consumers that cognitive science reveals makes appeal to selection
processes in determining the content of intermediate states implausible. Most
of these states, taken singly, make very limited and unspecic contributions
to overall behaviour. In consequence, ascription of content to these states
cannot be of the externalist kind relevant to the cognitive sciences. Their
representational contributions to any instance of behaviour  the repres-
entational functions they have been selected to perform  plausibly do not
involve entities external to the organism, but rather the proximal states and
processes that capture their direct, specic contributions to cognitive pro-
cessing. These states would thus have as their contents something along
the lines of `upstream cognitive subsystem in state x ' or `upstream neuron
active' (Cao 2012). However, such contents are unlikely to justify appeal to
representational explanation, insofar as nothing seems to be lost in terms of
explanatory power by shedding representational talk, and appealing rather
to causal interactions between cognitive subsystems and/or between neural
populations.
It may seen that a teleo-based notion of computation would share the
same fate. Given that teleofunctions to compute are similarly dependent
on selection processes, and since such processes care only about appropriate
external behaviour, it seems that internal components cannot possess spe-
cic computational teleofunctions for reasons similar to the above16. Most
16This damaging line of reasoning is not limited to teleo-based theories of computation
that appeal to selected-eects theories of teleology. Goal-based as well as design-based
24
of the intermediate computational states and processes in cognitive systems
make very indirect and variable contributions to external behaviour. Since
natural teleology relies on processes sensitive only to appropriate external
behaviour, it becomes unclear how such intermediaries, and their computa-
tional functions, can be individuated by means of a teleo-based theory of
computation.
Mechanistic and functional decomposition can come to the rescue. Al-
though natural teleology, at rst glance, can only bestow teleofunctions to
compute functions that go from sensory input to motor output, functional
and mechanistic decomposition help distribute computational responsibility
across intermediate states. Selection processes settle on a complex algorithm
or set of algorithms from sensory input to appropriate motor output. In light
of the teleofunction to carry out such complex algorithms, there is a break-
down of the contributions that intermediate states and processes make to
the overall algorithm. In this way, the theory bestows computational tele-
ofunctions on mediating states and processes in light of the computational
contributions they make to the performance of the complex algorithm it is
the teleofunction of the whole system to compute. Do these intermediate
teleofunctions help identify, in explanatorily powerful ways, the computa-
tional contributions that intermediate states and processes are supposed to
make to cognition and intelligent behaviour?
In contrast to the case of representational individuation, the answer is
positive. For unlike the case of representation, the teleofunctions that in-
termediate computational states and process have  according to the tele-
omechanistic view of computation  are to compute simpler input-output
functions that together make up the complex algorithm from sensory in-
put to motor output performed by the whole system. The teleomechanistic
view bestows on intermediate subsystems the teleofunction to manipulate
in specic ways the inputs they receive  individuated non-semantically, in
terms of functional or physical states  and generate outputs to be fed to
downstream computational subsystems. These bestowals of computational
theories also rely on external behaviour in order to bestow teleofunctions on systems, and
thus would also be vulnerable to the problem.
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function are explanatorily powerful. They help explain how the system comes
to implement the complicated algorithm that leads from sensory input and
internal states to behaviour by recognising the small, partial computational
contributions that intermediate states and processes internal to the system
make, and which together come to compose the overall function that the
whole system computes. While in the case of teleo-based theories of rep-
resentation, as Cao (2012) argues, we end up with content ascriptions that
have little to no explanatory purchase, the teleomechanistic view provides
computational ascriptions that play a distinctive explanatory role: they re-
veal the typically many-stepped richly-branched algorithm that leads from
sensory stimulus to motor behaviour.
The diculties of teleo-based views of representation in doing justice
to internal cognitive complexity are therefore not shared by the teleomech-
anistic view of computation. A theory of representation can exploit this
feature in order to avoid the problem of internal complexity, in at least two
mutually-exclusive ways.
First, by relying on the teleomechanistic view of computation, a theory of
representation may make use of the non-semantically individuated interme-
diate computational states and processes, and the contributions they have
the teleofunction to make to overall behaviour, to help distribute repres-
entational responsibility across the components of the cognitive system. A
theory of representation may be able to pick out a subset of computationally-
individuated states and processes that play representational roles by standing
in exploitable (and exploited) relations to salient features of the environment
 such as cognitive maps in entorhinal cortex (Moser et al. 2008).
Alternatively, theories of representation may reject representational ascrip-
tion to intermediate states and processes, while keeping allegiance to inter-
mediate computations and computational teleofunctions. On this view, the
units on which representations are bestowed are whole organisms, or at least
whole brains, as Cao (2012) suggests, since it is at this level of description
that talk of external behaviour is justied, and thereby appeal to selection
processes takes a direct hold. This Dennettian view is strongly revisionary
of mainstream cognitive science, since it rejects subpersonal representational
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vehicles, and thereby subpersonal representational explanation. However, by
means of the teleomechanistic view of computation, it is sensitive to subper-
sonal explanation cashed out in purely computational terms, thus following
mainstream cognitive science at least in its focus on the complex internal
goings-on that lead to cognition and intelligent behaviour.
Since my aim in this paper is to open up paths, rather than to tread
them, I remain neutral on which route is the most promising.
4.6 Misrepresentation and miscomputation
Finally, appealing to natural teleology in accounting for computation allows
for a sort of weak normativity already when it comes to computational work-
ings. This can be useful for a theory of representation insofar as it makes
it possible to distinguish dierent factors that may lead to inappropriate
behaviour. In particular, it opens the way for distinguishing cases in which
misrepresentation depends on computational error, from cases in which mis-
representation takes place despite the fact that the system correctly follows
its computational norms (i.e. fulls its computational teleofunctions).
Applying this point to teleosemantics does not entail that separate selec-
tion processes need be responsible for the representational and for the com-
putational teleofunctions of the system. It is compatible with the foregoing
that the same kinds of selective pressure led to both the representational
and computational organisation of the system  the former hinging on the
latter. However, it does not follow that there cannot be dissociations, i.e.
cases in which there is misrepresentation but no miscomputation, and even,
by a uke, miscomputation without misrepresentation. For instance, if the
environment is not the adequate one for the organism, the relations between
internal states and world that are relevant for representational success will
not obtain, leading to misrepresentation. But this is compatible with the
internal computational processes performing the correct computations, since
under the teleomechanistic view, the latter are non-semantic.
Moreover, attention to the role of (mis)computation in explaining be-
haviour can decrease the scope and weight of representational explanation,
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thereby helping to avoid overly liberal ascription of representational nature.
For explanation of behavioural inadequacy or error may be cashed out in
terms of pure miscomputation in cases in which the relevant computational
states and processes lack representational status. This is important to keep
in check the temptation to overextend representational explanation to cases,
capacities, or systems for which the notion makes little to no explanatory
contribution  thus risking to make appeal to representation lose its dis-
tinctive explanatory power, and with it, its theoretical justication17.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have argued that theories of cognitive representation have
much to gain by paying more attention to the roles that computation can
play in helping explain representation. More strongly, I have argued that the
received view of the conceptual relation between representation and compu-
tation should be turned on its head: computation helps explain representa-
tion, rather than the other way around. I have shown that this strategy holds
much promise if theories of representation rely on a robust, non-semantic,
teleo-based theory of computation such as the teleomechanistic account.
I have examined six advantages that theories of representation can reap
by adopting this approach: a) starting from computation seems more justi-
ed, since computation is arguably simpler or more primitive than represent-
ation, and has better naturalisation prospects; b) it helps to account for the
causal powers of representations; while the teleomechanistic view more spe-
cically c) helps to narrow down the states and processes that are candidates
for representational status, making more tractable problems with liberality
and, to a more limited extent, content indeterminacy; d) it individuates non-
semantically the complex internal organisation of cognitive systems; and e) it
makes space for useful distinctions between dierent sources of (behavioural)
error; all the while f) avoiding the main lines of objection against appeal to
teleology in theories of representation. While I have not provided here a de-
17See Artiga (2016) for a recent defence of radical liberality about representational
explanation, and about representational status more generally.
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tailed theory of representation along these lines, I hope to have shown that
it is a promising way to go for theories of representation in general.
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